Acting FBI director Andrew McCabe, who replaced James Comey after he was fired by President Trump, testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee on the topic of worldwide threats.
The committee is investigating Russia’s alleged meddling in the U.S. presidential election. Here is part of the testimony by McCabe and other top U.S. intelligence officials, including Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats, CIA Director Mike Pompeo and NSA Director Michael S. Rogers.
This file will update frequently.
SEN. RICHARD M. BURR, R-N.C.: ... Director McCabe, did you ever hear Director Comey tell the president that he was not the subject of an investigation -- excuse me did you ever hear Director Comey tell the president he was not the subject of an investigation?
ACTING FBI DIRECTOR ANDREW MCCABE: (inaudible) sir I -- I can't...
BURR: Could you do your microphone please?
MCCABE: Rookie mistake, I'm sorry. Sir, I can't comment on any conversations the director may have had with the president.
BURR: OK.
General Stewart, you heard Director Coats state on everybody' behalf that there is an expected deterioration of conditions in Afghanistan, can you give us DIA's assessment of the situation today in Afghanistan and what would change that deterioration?
LIEUTENANT GENERAL VINCENT STEWART (USMC), DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: Thanks Mr. Chairman. I -- I pay close attention to the operations in Afghanistan. I make two trips there each year, one before the fighting season and one following the fighting season. That way I get, on the ground, my own personal assessment of how things are going. I was there about six weeks ago.
The NDSF two years into taking control of the security environment in the end has had mixed results in this past year. Those mixed results can be characterized -- can characterize the security environment as a stalemate and, left unchecked, that stalemate will deteriorate in the favor of the belligerents. So we have to do something very different than what we've been doing in the past.
Let me back out just a little bit and talk about the fact that the Taliban failed to meet any of their strategic objectives that they outlined during the last fighting season. They controlled no district centers, they were able to execute high visibility attacks which causes a psychological effect, that has a debilitating effect. They maintain some influence in the rural areas but they control none of the large district centers.
Having said that, the Afghan National Defense Security Forces did not meet their force generation objectives, they had some success in training of the force, they were able to manage a crisis better than they have in the past, they were able to deploy forces, but failed, in my opinion, to employ the ISR and the fire support to make them as effective on the battlefield as possible. Unless we change something where we introduce either U.S. forces, NATO forces that changes the balance of forces on the ground, changes the fighting outputs on the ground or add additional training and advising capability at lower levels than we do now; the situation will continue to deteriorate and we'll lose all the gains that we've invested in over the last several years.
So they've got to get more trainers below the core level, I believe -- not sure how far down. Or they'd have to get more personnel on the ground; generate greater forces, greater fire support, greater use of ISR or this will in fact deteriorate further.
BURR: Thank you, General.
Admiral Rogers, every aspect of our daily lives continues to become part of a traceable, trackable interaction -- interacting environment now known as the internet of things. In addition, artificial intelligence, or A.I., has increasingly enabled technology to become autonomous.
What is the I.C.'s current assessment of the ever changing capabilities of the internet of things and what it presents?
ADM. MICHAEL S. ROGERS (USN), DIRECTOR, NSA: So it represents both opportunity, but -- from an information assurance or computer network defense perspective, it represents great concern. Where the ability to harness literally millions of devices that were built for a very simple day to day activities suddenly can be tied together and focus and oriented to achieve a specific outcome. We've seen this with denial of service attempts against a couple significant companies on East Coast of the United States in the course of the last year.
This is going to be a trend in the future, it's part of the discussions we're having -- I'm -- I'm in the midst of having some discussions in the private sector with -- this is going to be a problem that's common to both of us. How can we work together to try to, number one, understand this technology and, number two, ask ourselves how do we ensure that it's not turned around, if you will, against us.
BURR: Thank you for that.
Admiral Rogers, I'll probably put this to you as well. Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act authorizes the government to target only non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States for the purposes of acquiring foreign intelligence information. Section 702 cannot be used to target any person located inside the United States and the law prohibits the government from reverse targeting, that is targeting on non-U.S. person outside the United States specifically for the purpose of collecting the communications of a person inside the United States.
The I.C. uses FISA 702 collection authority to detect, identify and disrupt terrorist and other national security threats. How would you characterize 702 authority and its importance to the current intelligence collection platform overall? ROGERS: If we were to lose 702's authorities, we would be significantly degraded our ability to provide timely warning and insight as to what terrorist actors, nation states, criminal elements are doing that is of concern to our nation as well as our friends and allies. This 702 has provided us insight that is focused both on counterterrorism, but as well as counter proliferation, understanding what nation states are doing. It's given us tremendous insights in the computer network defense arena.
I would highlight much -- not all, much of what was in the intelligence community's assessment, for example, on the Russian efforts against the U.S. election process in 2016 was informed by knowledge we gained through 2702 authority.
BURR: Thank you for that.
Vice Chairman.
ROGERS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I've got a couple questions that I -- hopefully will be -- only require yes or no answers.
...
SEN. MARK WARNER, D-VA.: Intelligence community assessment accurately characterized the extent of Russian activities in the 2016 election and its conclusion that Russian intelligence agencies were responsible for the hacking and leaking of information and using misinformation to influence our elections? Simple yes or no would suffice.
ROBERT CARDILLO, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: I do. Yes, sir.
STEWART: Yes, Senator.
ROGERS: Yes I do.
DAN COATS, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE : Yes I do.
MIKE POMPEO, DIRECTOR, CIA: Yes.
MCCABE: Yes.
WARNER: And I guess the presumption there -- or the next presumption, I won't even ask this question is consequently that committee assess -- or that community assessment was unanimous and is not a piece of fake news or evidence of some other individual or nation state other than Russia. So I appreciate that again for the record.
I warned you Mr. McCabe I was going to have to get you on the record as well on this. Mr. McCabe for as long as you are Acting FBI Director do you commit to informing this committee of any effort to interfere with the FBI's ongoing investigation into links between Russia and the Trump campaign?
MCCABE: I absolutely do.
WARNER: Thank you so much for that. I think in light of what's happened in the last 48 hours it's critically important that we have that assurance and I hope you'll relay, at least from me to the extraordinary people that work at the FBI that this committee supports them, supports their efforts, support their professionalism and supports their independence.
MCCABE: I will sir, thank you.
WARNER: In light of the fact that we just saw French elections where it felt like deja vu all over again in terms of the release of a series of e-mails against Mr. Macron days before the election and the fact that this committee continues to investigate the type of tactics that Russia has used.
Where do we stand, as a country, of preparation to make sure this doesn't happen again in 2018 and 2020 -- where have we moved in terms of collaboration with state voting -- voter files, in terms of working more with the tech community, particularly the platform -- platform entities in terms of how we can better assure real news versus fake news, is there some general sense -- Director Coats I know you've only been in the job for a short period of time -- of how we're going to have a strategic effort? Because while it was Russia in 2016 other nation states could -- you know -- launch similar type assaults.
COATS: Well, we are -- we will continue to use all the assets that we have in terms of collection and analysis relative to what the influence has been and potentially could be in future. Russians have spread this across the globe -- interestingly enough I met with the Prime Minister of Montenegro the latest nation to join NATO, the number 29 nation, what was the main topic?
Russian interference in their political system. And so it does -- it sweeps across Europe and other places. It's clear though, the Russians have upped their game using social media and other opportunities that we -- in ways that we haven't seen before. So it's a great threat to our -- our democratic process and our job here is to provide the best intelligence we can to the policy makers to -- as they develop a strategy in terms of how to best reflect a response to this.
WARNER: Well one of the things I'm concerned about is, we've all expressed this concern but since this doesn't fall neatly into any particular agency's jurisdiction you know, who's -- who's taking the point on interacting with the platform companies like the Google, Facebook and Twitter, who's taking the point in terms of interacting DHS image in terms of state boards of election? How are we trying to ensure that our systems more secure, and if we can get a brief answer on that because I got one last question for Admiral Rogers.
COATS: Well, I think the -- the obviously, our office tasks and takes the point, but there's contribution from agencies across the I.C. We will -- I've asked Director Pompeo to address that and others that might want to address that also. But each of us -- each of the agencies to the extent that they can and have the capacity whether its NSA though SIGINT, whether it's NSA through human or other sources will provide information to us that we want to use as a basis to provide to our -- to our policymakers.
Relative to a grand strategy, I am not aware right now of any -- I think we're still assessing the impact. We have not put a grand strategy together, which would not be our purview, we would provide the basis of intelligence that would then be the foundation for what that strategy would be.
WARNER: My hope -- my hope would be that we need to be proactive in this. We don't want to be sitting here kind of looking back at it after 2018 election cycle. Last question, very briefly, Admiral Rogers do you have any doubt that the Russians were behind the intervention in the French elections?
ROGERS: I -- let me phrase it this way, we are aware of some Russian activity directed against the Russian -- excuse me, directed against the French election process. As I previously said before Congress earlier this week, we in fact reached out to our French counterparts to say, we have become aware of this activity, we want to make you aware, what are you seeing?
I'm not in a position to have looked at the breadth of the French infrastructure. So I'm -- I'm not really in a position to make a whole simple declaratory statement.
WARNER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
BURR: Senator Rubio?
RUBIO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. McCabe, can you without going into the specific of any individual investigation, I think the American people want to know, has the dismissal of Mr. Comey in any way impeded, interrupted, stopped or negatively impacted any of the work, any investigation, or any ongoing projects at the Federal Bureau of Investigations?
MCCABE: As you know, Senator, the work of the men and women of the FBI continues despite any changes in circumstance, any decisions. So there has been no effort to impede our investigation today. Quite simply put sir, you cannot stop the men and women of the FBI from doing the right thing, protecting the American people, and upholding the Constitution.
RUBIO: And this is for all the members of the committee, as has been widely reported, and people know this, Kaspersky Lab software is used by not hundreds of thousands, millions of Americans. To each of our witnesses I would just ask, would any of you be comfortable with the Kaspersky Lab software on your computers?
MCCABE: A resounding no, from me.
POMPEO: No.
COATS: No, Senator.
ROGERS: No, sir.
STEWART: No, Senator.
CARDILLO: No, sir.
RUBIO: On the -- Director Pompeo, on Venezuela which was mentioned in Director Coat's statements, as all of you are probably well aware, armed civilian groups our colectivos, these militias in the street have been armed by the regime for purposes of defending, for lack of a better term, the regime from protesters.
We all are aware of the Maduro regime's cozy relationship with Hezbollah, with the FARC, which is a designated terrorist organization, and links to narco trafficking.
POMPEO: Among the weapons and stockpile of the military in Venezuela are igla-S, basically the Russian variant of our stinger missiles.
RUBIO: And Director Pompeo, if you could comment on the risk that I believe exists; that as these groups become more desperate -- potential even operate at some point outside the control of the Maduro regime, they're running around in the streets also in search of money and food and anything else that they want to get their hands on. The threat of any advanced weaponry, such as what I've just mentioned, being sold or transferred to the FARC, a terrorist organization; sold to drug cartels in Mexico, potentially; or even sold to terrorist organizations on the black market.
Is that a real threat? Is that something we should be cognizant of?
POMPEO: Senator, it is a real threat. As we have all seen, the situation in Venezuela continues to deteriorate, Maduro gets more desperate by the hour. The risk of these collectivos (ph) acting in a way that is not under his control increases as time goes on as well.
In a classified setting I'm happy to share with you a little bit more about the details of what we know. We have not seen any of those major arms transfers take place, we don't have any evidence that those have taken place to date. But those stockpiles exist not only -- not only in the Maduro regime, but other places as well. There are plenty of weapons running around in Venezuela. And this risk is incredibly real and serious and ultimate threat to South America and Central America in addition to just in Venezuela.
RUBIO: Staying in the Western Hemisphere for -- for a moment and -- and is the potential results with the director -- Director McCabe as well as you, Director Pompeo.
I continue to be concerned about the potential, and what I believe is the reality, of a concerted effort on the part of the Cuban government to recruit and unwittingly enlist Americans -- business executives and others, even local and state political leaders an effort to have them influence of U.S. policy making on Cuba. And particularly the lifting of the embargo. Would this be a tactic consistent with what we have seen in the past from other nation states, including the regime in Cuba?
POMPEO: I'll -- I'll let Mr. McCabe make a comment as well, but yes, of course. Frankly, this is consistent with what -- right, this is the -- the -- the attempt to interfere in United States is not limited to Russia. The Cubans have deep ties, it is in their deepest tradition to take American visitors and do their best influence of the way that is in adverse to U.S. interests.
MCCABE: Yes, sir. Fully agree, we share your concerns about that issue.
RUBIO: And my final question is on -- all this focus on Russia and what's happened in the past is that the opinion of all of you -- or those of -- you certainly all have insight on this. That even as we focus on 2016 and the efforts leading up to that election, efforts to influence policy making here in the United States vis-a-vis the Russian interests are ongoing that the Russians continue to use active measures; even at this moment, even on this day.
To try, through the use of multiple different ways, to influence the political debate and the decisions made in American politics; particularly as they pertain to Russia's interests around the world. In essence, these active measures is an ongoing threat, not simply something that happened in the past.
MCCABE: Yes, sir, that's right.
POMPEO: Senator, it's right. In some sense, though, we've got to put it in context, this has been going on for a long time. There's -- there's nothing new. Only the cost has been lessened, the cost of doing it.
COATS: I -- I would just add that the use of cyber and social media has significantly increased the impact and the capabilities that -- obviously this has been done for years and years. Even decades. But the ability they have to -- to use the interconnectedness and -- and all the -- all that that provides, that didn't provide before I -- they literally upped their game to the point where it's having a significant impact.
ROGERS: From my perspective I would just highlight cyber is enabling them to access information in massive quantities that weren't quite obtainable to the same level previously and that's just another tool in their attempt to acquire information, misuse of that information, manipulation, outright lies, inaccuracies at time.
But other times, actually dumping raw data which is -- as we also saw during this last presidential election cycle for us.
BURR: Senator Feinstein.
FEINSTEIN: Thanks very much Mr. Chairman.
Where there's obviously more than one threat to our country, I would argue that the greatest danger to the United States is North Korea and I am one of those who have been very worried and trying to follow this as close as possible.
In the statement for the record you state, and I quote, "North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programs will continue to pose a serious threat to U.S. interest and to the security environment in East Asia in 2017." You go on to thank -- state, "Pyongyang is committed...
(UNKNOWN): Thank you.
FEINSTEIN: ... to developing a long range nuclear armed missile that is capable of posing a direct threat to the United States." These assessments combined with North Korea's behavior, recent ballistic missile launches and proximity to U.S. forces and allies in Asia is deeply concerning.
For the purpose of this open hearing could each of you express the threat posed by North Korea in this public setting and then address, most importantly, some of the specific actions were taken -- we're taking as a nation? And some of it you may want to do in the closed hearing later.
COATS: I think we could get into greater detail in the closed hearing but it's clear that we have assessed this as a -- a very significant, potentially existential threat to the United States that has to be addressed. You're aware there's been considerable discussion among the policy makers with our providing intelligence with -- with the administration relative to steps moving forward.
General Mattis has taken a major role in this as well as our secretary of State and others. The interaction with the Chinese of late -- we think it can play a significant role in terms of how we deal with this. We have dedicated a very significant amount of our intelligence resources to North -- the issue of North Korea. And I think we'd look forward to going deeper into all of that in a classified session.
FEINSTEIN: Let me ask this, is it possible, in this hearing, to estimate when they will have an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of taking a nuclear warhead?
COATS: I -- I think it would be best if safe that for the -- those kind of details for the closed session.
FEINSTEIN: Can you say in this session how effective China has been in stopping some of the testing?
POMPEO: Senator Feinstein let me -- let me try to answer that as best I can. I actually just returned from Korea I was there last week. I had chance to meet with our great soldiers, General Brooks and his team as well as the great soldiers of the Republic of Korea Army who are on the frontlines there, they're doing amazing work in a difficult condition. With respect to the Chinese, they have made efforts in a way that they have not made before.
FEINSTEIN: Good.
POMPEO: In an effort to close down the trade that they have and putting pressure, diplomatic pressure as well, on the North Koreans. The intelligence suggests we're going to need more to shake free this terribly challenging problem. And -- and that they could do more. And they have the capacity to do more as well.
FEINSTEIN: Could you be specific? It's my -- have they entirely stopped cold? What -- to what degree have they reduced it? And how about oil and other commodities?
POMPEO: I'd prefer to defer the details of that to the classified setting, but there have been restrictions on coal that have been significant.
FEINSTEIN: Is there any other comment?
STEWART: If I -- if I could, Senator, North Korea has declared its intent. It's said it publicly, it produces propaganda images that shows their intent to develop intercontinental missile,s nuclear armed. What we've not seen them do is do a complete end-to-end test of an ICBM with a nuclear device.
In the closed session we can talk about how close they might be to doing that. But they're certainly unparalleled fast nuclear device, processing enough fissile material for nuclear warheads and developing a wide range of missile technology; short, intermediate, long range missile technology.
So they're going to put those two together at some point, but we have not seen them do that tested end-to-end; missile launch intercontinental range, miniaturization and survival of a reentry vehicle. But they're on that path and they're committed to doing.
FEINSTEIN: Thank you.
CARDILLO: I'd just add, Senator, on top of General Stewart's comments, that they are in a race. He's pushing very hard on the accelerator here. This whole panel is well aware of that and -- and we are doing everything in our power, and we can give you the details in closed, to make sure that we give you and our -- our customers the advantage to win that race.
FEINSTEIN: If I might just say, Mr. Cardillo, you've -- you've given us very good information, very solid information; it is much appreciated. I think at, you know, it is time for the American people to begin to understand that, as a director said, we do in fact have an existential threat in the Pacific Ocean and we need to come to grips with it.
BURR: Senator Blunt.
BLUNT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Coats, let me join everybody else in welcoming you back to the committee, this time on the other side of the -- of the hearing at table. But pleased, along with others, that you take this responsibility.
It's my understanding, I want to talk just a little bit about the to executive orders on of vetting that the president has been challenged on in court. My understanding is you're -- as the DNI involved in that vetting -- in that process, is that right? The screening process, is that something that reports up through you?
COATS: You're talking about the classification process?
BLUNT: Yes -- well, I'm talking about the extreme vetting where the president's issued -- the first executive order was January 27th where the president's order said that we'd suspend refugee admissions from certain countries for 90 days pending a review.
There's also 120 days mentioned in that order. And since were beyond 90 days and approaching the 120 days, my real question is are we -- in spite of what's happening outside of the organization, are we continuing pursue that timeline and are we about to get to the 120 days of having that review period behind us?
COATS: I would like to take that question and get back to you with the specifics relative to the days away,what is been done to this particular date and are we on -- on target. Obviously, this is -- this is going forward, I don't have details in front of me right now, but I'd be happy to get that information for you.
BLUNT: Good, I'd be interested in that, I'd be very concerned frankly, if we're now over 100, close to 120 into that timeframe to find out the 120 days didn't get the job done because we were waiting to figure out how the order could be properly enforced. And so I'd be interested in that. On the cyber front, Director Cardillo, I know among other things, your organization has conducted what you've called a hackathon or at least have been called hackathons. What has that done in terms of bringing other people into the discussion of how we protect ourselves better from these cyber attacks?
CARDILLO: Sure, thank you, Senator. So we're quite proud at NGA of our history of support to the community and to you. But through predominantly historically closed systems, government owned systems, et cetera, as the committee's already discussed and the panel's responded clearly, the -- the high-tech reality of our world, the interconnectedness of the internet, et cetera.
So what we're trying to do is take that historic success of our expertise and our experience and then engage with that community in a way that we can better leverage our data, in a way to inform and warn you. And so I'm trying to tap into the agility and the innovation of that community. We use these hackathons to put out challenge questions in which we can engage with industry and academic in a way that -- that'll enable us to do our job better.
BLUNT: Let me ask one more question, we had a -- we had a witness before this committee on March the 30th in an open hearing, Clint Watts, who observed that he said, quote, "The intelligence community is very biased against open source information," that ends his quote. I may come to you on that too, Director Pompeo. But in terms of geospatial, what -- what are you doing there with open source information?
CARDILLO: We're -- we're engaging, as Admiral Rogers mentioned though there -- you know, there's an upside to this connectedness and the fact that -- that the commercial market and the commercial imagery market is getting into a business that was prior a government-only entity has great advantage and we seek to build on that and take -- take advantage of those developments. We also need to go in eyes wide open and realize that there is a risk.
So I don't have a bias. I have an awareness and appreciation for this open development and innovation and my commitment is to smartly engage with it, to make sure that we -- we use the best of it while we're aware that there -- there is a risk as we do so.
BLUNT: Director Pompeo, do you think that was a fair criticism that the intelligence community is biased against using open source information?
POMPEO: Several I think historically, that may well have been true. I don't think that's the case today. We have an enormous open- source enterprise that does its best to stay up with world class and information management get information that is not -- not stolen secrets, but open-source information to the right place at the right time to help inform the intelligence that would provide to you and to our other customers. So today, I would -- I would say that statement is inaccurate.
BLUNT: Thank you, Director. Thank you, Chairman.
BURR: Senator Cornyn?
CORNYN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me ask -- let me highlight one issue and then ask a question, Director Coats, about another issue I'd invite comment from any one who has something they want to offer. I've become increasingly concerned about foreign governments hiring lobbyists here in Washington. And unbeknownst to members of Congress, actually lobbing Congress to enact policies which may be contrary to the best interest of the American people, of course the Foreign Agent Registration Act provides some level of transparency for that but I just highlight that issue and we can come back to it at a later time because I want to ask you about another topic as well.
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, or CFIUS, provides a very important role in determining whether there are technology transfers from the United States to foreign governments and I'm -- was happy to see Director Coats, your comments on page four of your written statement specifically regarding China's increasing effort to use investment as a way to improve its technological capabilities.
China we've seen continues to use an aggressive campaign to vacuum up advanced U.S. technology however and whenever it can, whether stealing it through cyber or buying it in the open market. Do you feel like the current CFIUS process adequately protects against this threat vector and are all elements of the U.S. government cognizant of these vulnerabilities?
COATS: I can't speak to how many agents of -- of the U.S. government are as cognizant as perhaps we should be but I certainly think that, given China's aggressive approach relative to information gathering and -- and all the things that you mentioned merits a -- a review of CFIUS in terms of whether or not it is -- needs to have some changes or innovations to -- to address the aggressive -- aggressive Chinese actions not just against or companies, but across the world.
They -- they clearly have a strategy through their investments, they've started a major investment bank -- you name a park of the world Chinese probably are -- are there looking to put investments in. We've seen the situation in Djibouti where they're also adding military capability to their investment, strategic area for -- on the Horn of Africa there that -- that you wouldn't necessarily expect. But they're active in Africa, Northern Africa, they're active across the world.
Their one belt, one road process opens -- opens their trade and -- and what other interest they have to the Indian Ocean in -- and a different way to address nations that they've had difficulty connecting with. So it's a -- it's clearly an issue that we ought to take a look at.
CORNYN: Thank you. POMPEO: Senator -- Senator Cornyn if I might...
CORNYN: Go ahead.
POMPEO: ... just add one comment.
CORNYN: Please.
POMPEO: I'm sorry -- two quick comments.
One on CFIUS, you know it mostly deals with changing control transactions, purchases. There are many other ways one could invest in an entity here in the United States and exert significant control over that entity, I think that ought to be looked at.
And then second and apart from CFIUS there are many vectors, you mentioned several. Another places are educational institutions where there are many folks coming here, some of who are coming here in good faith to learn but others who are being sent here with less noble undertakings and missions.
CORNYN: Thank you.
Admiral Rogers.
(CROSSTALK)
ROGERS: And the only additional comment I was going to make was, it is clear as we watch China and other nations they are gaining greater insights as to our CFIUS processes, the criteria that we use that tend to shape our decision process. And so I think that's also an issue of concern that we're aware of here.
CORNYN: Thank you. I look forward to visiting with you in the closed session later on.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
BURR: Senator Wyden.
WYDEN: Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, it's fair to say I disagreed with Director Comey as much as anyone in this room but the timing of this firing is wrong to anyone with a semblance of ethics. Director Comey should be here this morning testifying to the American people about where the investigation he's been running stands.
At our public hearing in January where he refused to discuss his investigation into connections between Russia and Trump associates I stated my fear that if the information didn't come out before inauguration day it might never come out. With all the recent talk in recent weeks about whether there is evidence of collusion, I fear some colleagues have forgotten that Donald Trump urged the Russians to hack his opponents. He also said repeatedly that he loved WikiLeaks.
So the question is not whether Donald Trump actively encouraged the Russians and WikiLeaks to attack our democracy, he did; that is an established fact. The only question is whether he or someone associated with him coordinated with the Russians.
Now, Mr. McCabe, the president's letter to Director Comey asserted that on three separate occasions the director informed him that he was not under investigations. Would it have been wrong for the director to inform him he was not under investigations? Yes or no?
MCCABE: Sir, I'm not going to comment on any conversations that the director may have had with the president...
(CROSSTALK)
WYDEN: I didn't ask that. Would it have been wrong for the director to inform him he was not under investigation? That's not about conversations, that's yes or no answer.
MCCABE: As you know, Senator. We typically do not answer that question. I will not comment on whether or not the director and the president of the United States had that conversation.
WYDEN: Will you refrain from these kinds of alleged updates to the president or anyone else in the White House on the status of the investigation?
MCCABE: I will.
WYDEN: Thank you.
Director Pompeo, one of the few key unanswered questions is why the president didn't fire Michael Flynn after Acting Attorney General Yates warned the White House that he could be blackmailed by the Russians. Director Pompeo, did you know about the acting attorney general's warnings to the White House or were you aware of the concerns behind the warning?
POMPEO: I -- I don't have any comment on that.
WYDEN: Well, were you aware of the concerns behind the warning? I mean, this is a global threat. This is a global threat question, this is a global threat hearing. Were you...
(CROSSTALK)
POMPEO: Tell me...
(CROSSTALK)
WYDEN: Were you aware?
POMPEO: Senator, tell me what global threat it is you're concerned with, please. I'm not sure I understand the question.
WYDEN: Well, the possibility of blackmail. I mean, blackmail by a influential military official, that has real ramifications for the global threat. So this is not about a policy implication, this is about the national security advisor being vulnerable to blackmail by the Russians. And the American people deserve to know whether in these extraordinary circumstances the CIA kept them safe.
POMPEO: Yes, sir, the CIA's kept America safe. And...
WYDEN: So...
POMPEO: And the people at the Central Intelligence Agency are committed to that and will remain committed to that. And we will...
(CROSSTALK)
POMPEO: ... do that in the face of...
WYDEN: You won't answer the question...
POMPEO: We will do that in the face of political challenges that come from any direction, Senator.
WYDEN: But, you will not answer the question of whether or not you were aware of the concerns behind the Yates warning.
POMPEO: Sir, I don't know exactly what you're referring to with the Yates warning, I -- I -- I wasn't part of any of those conversations. I -- I... (CROSSTALK)
WYDEN: The Yates warning was...
(CROSSTALK)
POMPEO: ... I have no first hand information with respect to the warning that was given.
WYDEN: OK.
POMPEO: She didn't make that warning to me. I -- I can't -- I can't answer that question, Senator...
WYDEN: OK.
POMPEO: ... as much as I would like to.
WYDEN: OK.
Director Coats, how concerned are you that a Russian government oil company, run by a Putin crony could end up owning a significant percentage of U.S. oil refining capacity and what are you advising the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States about this?
COATS: I don't have specific information relative to that. I think that's something that potentially, we could provide intelligence on in terms of what this -- what situation might be, but...
WYDEN: I'd like you to furnace that in writing. Let me see if I can get one other question in, there have been mountains of press stories with allegations about financial connections between Russia and Trump and his associates. The matters are directly relevant to the FBI and my question is, when it comes to illicit Russian money and in particular, it's potential to be laundered on its way to the United States, what should the committee be most concerned about?
We hear stories about Deutsche Bank, Bank of Cypress, Shell companies in Moldova, the British Virgin Islands. I'd like to get your sense because I'm over my time. Director McCabe, what you we most -- be most concerned about with respect to illicit Russian money and its potential to be laundered on its way the United States?
MCCABE: Certainly sir. So as you know, I am not in the position to be able to speak about specific investigations and certainly not in this setting. However, I will confirm for you that those are issues that concern us greatly.
They have traditionally and they do even more so today, as it becomes easier to conceal the origin and the -- and the track and the destination of purpose of illicit money flows, as the exchange of information becomes more clouded in encryption and then more obtuse, it becomes harder and harder to get to the bottom of those investigations. That would shed light on those issues.
WYDEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. BURR: Senator Risch?
RISCH: Thank you very much. Gentlemen, I -- the purpose of this hearing as the chairman expressed is to give the American people some insight into what we all do, which they don't see pretty much at all. And so I think what I want to do is I want to make an observation and then I want to get your take on it, anybody who wants to volunteer. And I'm going to start with you Director Coats, to volunteer.
My -- I have been -- I've been on this committee all the time I've been here in the Senate and all through the last administration. And I have been greatly impressed by the current administrations hitting the ground running during the first hundred days, as far as their engagement on intelligence matters and their engagement with foreign countries. The national media here is focused on domestic issues which is of great interest to the American people be it healthcare, be it personnel issues in the government.
And they don't -- the -- the media isn't as focused on this administrations fast, and in my judgment, robust engagement with the intelligence communities around the world and with other governments. And my impression is that it's good and it is aggressive. And I want -- I'd like you're -- I'd like your impression of where we're going. Almost all of you had real engagement in the last administration and all the administrations are different. So Director Coats, you want to take that on to start with?
COATS: I'd be happy to start with that, I think most presidents that come into office come with an agenda in mind in terms of what issues they'd like to pursue, many of them issues that effect -- domestic issues that affect infrastructure and education and a number of things only to find that this is dangerous world, that the United States -- that the threats that exist out there need to be -- be given attention to.
This president, who I think the perception was not interested in that, I think Director Pompeo and I can certify the fact that we have spent far more hours in the Oval Office than we anticipated. The president is a voracious consumer of information and asking questions and asking us to provide intelligence. I -- we are both part of a process run through the national security council, General McMaster, all through the deputy's committees and the principal's committees consuming hours and hours of time looking at the threats, how do we address those threats, what is the intelligence that tells us -- that informs the policy makers in terms of how they put a strategy in place.
And so what I initially thought would be a one or two time a week, 10 to 15 minute quick brief, has turned into an everyday, sometimes exceeding 45 minutes to an hour or more just in briefing the president. We have -- I have brought along several of our directors to come and show the president what their agencies do and how important it is the info -- that the information they provide how that -- for the basis of making policy decisions.
I'd like to turn to my CIA colleague to get -- let him give you, and others, to give you their impression.
RISCH: I appreciate that. We're almost out of time but I did -- Director Pompeo you kind of sit in the same spot we all sit in through the last several years and I kind of like your observations along the line of Director Coats, what you feel about the matter?
POMPEO: Yeah, I think Director Coats had it right. He and I spend time with the president everyday, briefing him with the most urgent intelligence matters that are presented to us as -- in our roles. He asks good, hard questions. Make us go make sure we're doing our work in the right way.
Second, you asked about engagement in the world. This administration has reentered the battle space in places the administration -- the previous administration was completely absent. You all travel some too...
RISCH: Yes.
POMPEO: ... you will hear that when you go travel. I've now taken two trips to places and they welcome American leadership. They're not looking for American soldiers, they're not looking for American boots on the ground, they're looking for American leadership around the globe and this president has reentered that space in a way that I think will serve America's interest very well.
RISCH: Yeah I -- I couldn't agree more and we -- we deal with them not only overseas but they come here, as you know, regularly.
POMPEO: Yes sir.
RISCH: And the fact that the president has pulled the trigger twice as he has in -- in the first 100 days and -- and done it in a fashion that didn't start a world war and -- and was watched by both our friends and our enemies has made a significant and a huge difference as far as our standing in the world. My time's up. Thank you very much Mr. Chair.
WARNER: Thank you Senator.
Senator Heinrich.
HEINRICH: Director McCabe you -- you obviously have several decades of law enforcement experience, is it -- is it your experience that people who are innocent of wrong doing typically need to be reassured that they're not the subject of an investigation?
MCCABE: No sir.
HEINRICH: And I ask that because I'm still trying to make heads or tails of the dismissal letter from -- earlier this week from the president where he writes, "While I greatly appreciate you informing me, on three separate occasions, that I am not under investigation." And I'm still trying to figure out why that would even make it into a dismissal letter. But let me go to something a little more direct.
Director, has anyone in the White House spoken to you directly about the Russia investigation?
MCCABE: No, sir.
HEINRICH: Let me -- when -- when did you last meet with the president, Director McCabe?
MCCABE: I don't think I -- I'm in...
HEINRICH: Was it earlier this week?
MCCABE: ... the position to comment on that. I have met with the president this week, but I really don't want to go into the details of that.
HEINRICH: OK. But Russia did not come up?
MCCABE: That's correct, it did not.
HEINRICH: OK, thank you. We've heard in the news that -- that -- claims that Director Comey had -- had lost the confidence of rank and file FBI employees. You've been there for 21 years, in your opinion is it accurate that the rank and file no longer supported Director Comey?
MCCABE: No, sir, that is not accurate. I can tell you, sir, that I worked very, very closely with Director Comey. From the moment he started at the FBI I was his executive assistant director of national security at that time and I worked for him running the Washington field office. And of course I've served as deputy for the last year.
More coming soon.
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