Professional Documents
Culture Documents
The United States of America, by and through its representative, the U.S. Attorney for the
District of Columbia, files this Reply to the Defendant’s Memorandum in support of its position
representations about his conduct in this case that are flatly incorrect. As discussed herein,
defendant Wolfe’s conduct was not aberrant; rather, it reveals a pattern of behavior in which he
used his position as Director of Security for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (“SSCI”)
in order to cultivate relationships with multiple young, female reporters, who were attempting to
gain information about SSCI business. Wolfe hid his conduct in furtherance of this selfish aim, a
behavior that ultimately culminated in his repeated lies to the FBI — intentional falsehoods that
had an actual impact on the national security functions of the FBI and had the potential to disrupt
Further, contrary to defendant Wolfe’s assertions, his lies to the FBI were not cured
immediately. He repeatedly lied in his December 2017 FBI interview about whether he provided
information to reporters, and he lied again in his January 2018 interview. Wolfe’s lies to the FBI
about his unauthorized contacts with reporters were calculated. The lies disrupted an ongoing
national security investigation – a harm he appreciated based on his position of trust. The
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government asks the Court to consider the totality of the defendant’s behavior underlying the
charged offense. That conduct, and his lies about that conduct, undermined the public trust.
Taking all aggravating circumstances and factors into account, a sentence of 24 months of
In March 2017, the Department of Justice provided to the SSCI classified materials that
revealed the existence of and predication for the FISA surveillance of MALE-1. At that time,
defendant Wolfe was the Director of Security for the SSCI, and he was charged with safeguarding
information furnished to the SSCI to facilitate the SSCI’s critical oversight function. In this role,
Wolfe was involved in the logistical process by which the FISA application was provided to the
SSCI. He was, in short, definitely aware of “the FISA,” as he admitted to the FBI in October 30,
2018.
On December 15, 2017, and again on January 11, 2018, the FBI interviewed Wolfe in
connection with its investigation into the leak of classified information about the FISA surveillance
of MALE-1. During these interviews, Wolfe lied, and lied repeatedly, about his contacts with
reporters. Wolfe asserts in his sentencing memorandum (p. 15), that these lies did not harm any
victim, and that “to the extent one may consider either his wife (a former FBI agent) or the SSCI
(including the current Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee) as victims here, it is notable
that they both urge the Court to impose a lenient, non-penal sentence.” This assertion is misplaced.
When the FBI learned that Wolfe had been engaged in an lengthy, intimate relationship
with REPORTER #2, a national security reporter who herself had published an article about
MALE-1 in April 2017, the FBI expanded its investigation to determine whether Wolfe had
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disseminated to unauthorized individuals classified information that had been entrusted to him
over the past three decades in his role as SSCI Director of Security. As set forth in the attached
Declaration of Special Agent Brian Dugan, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, FBI’s Washington
Field Office, the FBI took immediate additional steps to thoroughly investigate and closely
monitor Wolfe’s activities in order to determine whether the FBI needed to warn the broader USIC
At the time Wolfe lied, the FBI was engaged in an investigation to identify the individual(s)
who leaked classified information, the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be
expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Having served as SSCI Director of
Security for nearly three decades, and having been responsible for safeguarding classified national
security information provided to the SSCI from throughout the USIC, Wolfe fully appreciated the
grave national security consequences of misleading federal agents in their efforts to investigate the
investigation; thus, they warrant upward departures pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.7 and 5K2.14,
Wolfe argues repeatedly and incorrectly in his sentencing memorandum that he was
prosecuted for making a “foolish” decision to lie about his years-long relationship with
REPORTER #2, and that he corrected this lie “almost immediately.” (p. 2, 4, 14, 17 and 22). He
further asserts, correctly, that the fact that he had engaged in a relationship with REPORTER #2
was known to the agents at the time of the December 15, 2017, interview. But Wolfe’s lie about
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his relationship with REPORTER #2 (and his disclosures of information to her) was not the only
Wolfe was also charged with lying, and lying repeatedly, about his unauthorized contacts
with multiple reporters during which he disclosed information that he learned as SSCI’s Director
of Security that was not otherwise publicly available. Those unauthorized contacts with reporters
were not known to investigators until Wolfe admitted to some of them in his January 11, 2018
interview. Moreover, even during that interview, Wolfe explicitly lied when he denied disclosing
non-public SSCI information to them. To this day, Wolfe has only admitted to disclosing such
information to REPORTER #3, and he did not do so until the time of his plea on October 15, 2018.
Contrary to Wolfe’s repeated assertions in his sentencing memorandum (p. 4, 14), the
investigators did not know about his unauthorized contacts with other reporters at the time of the
December 15, 2017 interview. Investigators did not learn of these contacts until the January 11,
2018 interview, when Wolfe generally admitted having contact with REPORTER #1. He also
admitted having a “few reporter friends,” and named REPORTERS #3, #4, #5, and #6.1
During that interview, Wolfe was asked to complete a second Investigative Questionnaire
1
REPORTERS #3 - #6 are all young, female national security reporters. See Exhibit 15.
Information about REPORTERS #5 and #6 and Wolfe’s contacts with them were disclosed to the
defense in discovery.
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Wolfe responded, “No,” orally and in writing. In fact, the FBI discovered following the January
11, 2018 interview, that the defendant had used the encrypted Signal application to communicate
with REPORTERS #3, #4, #5, and #6, and that the defendant provided non-public SSCI
information about national security investigations to each of these reporters. See Exhibits 7A-7D
(REPORTER #3), Exhibit 9C (REPORTER #4), Exhibit 16 (REPORTER #5), Exhibit 17A
(REPORTER #6).
Moreover, the FBI’s later discovery of Wolfe’s encrypted communications with one of the
young reporters at issue is particularly telling, bespeaking quite a practiced and premeditated
pattern of behavior. When Wolfe volunteered to act as a confidential source for REPORTER #4,
it was on the condition that she promise to never to use his name with any of the reporter’s
colleagues. See Exhibit 9B. Wolfe engaged in similar communications with REPORTER #3
(Exhibit 7E) and REPORTER #5 (Exhibit 16). And after providing REPORTER #6 with non-
public information, he instructed her as follows: “DO NOT TELL ANYONE.” Exhibit 17B.
Finally, Wolfe’s assertion that he immediately corrected his lies about the extent of his
contact with REPORTER #2 is simply incorrect. The defendant and REPORTER #2 had an
extraordinary volume of contacts: in the ten months between December 1, 2016, and October 10,
2017, alone, they exchanged more than 25,750 text messages and had 556 phone calls, an average
of more than 83 contacts per day. The FBI was unable to recover a significant portion of these
text messages because they had been deleted by the defendant. Moreover, there is reason to believe
that Wolfe falsely denied to the FBI that he provided “scoops, leads, or information related to the
SSCI” to Reporter #2 during their multiple-year relationship. For instance, in May 2017,
REPORTER #1 published an article reporting, for the first time, on certain communications at the
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highest level of the government. That same day, defendant Wolfe texted REPORTER #2, “Didn’t
I tell you a while back” the information that was published in REPORTER #1’s article. See also
Exhibit 12 (“I always tried to give you as much information that I could . . . so that you could get
dependent on the degree to which it is a “spontaneous and seemingly thoughtless act rather than
one which is the result of substantial planning.” United States v. Dyce, 91 F.3d 1462, 1470 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (rejecting totality of the circumstances test). This analysis focuses on the defendant’s
conduct, and not the defendant’s otherwise good standing and lack of criminal history.
Here, the defendant’s conduct was not spontaneous or thoughtless; rather, it was sustained
and calculated. The defendant’s duplicitous conduct began when he entered into a relationship
multiple reporters using the encrypted application Signal, and continued even after he was
removed from his position as Director of Security following his December 15, 2017 interview,
When Wolfe violated his duty, first by engaging in furtive exchanges with multiple
reporters, and second, by lying multiple times to the FBI, he foreseeably placed in some jeopardy
the SSCI’s ability to accomplish its important mission of overseeing the USIC. The SSCI must be
able to obtain from the Executive Branch highly sensitive and classified intelligence secrets, and
the USIC will only provide that information on the condition that those secrets remain safe and
uncompromised.
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Unlike other defendants who may only appreciate that lying to federal agents is wrong,
Wolfe also possessed specialized knowledge that what he was doing could have an impact on SSCI
business, and by extension, the national security. Every day that the defendant reported to work
at the SSCI SCIF from December 2013 to December 2017 – a period spanning over 1400 days –
he knew he was violating the trust placed upon him by the SSCI and the USIC. Wolfe’s conduct
was sustained over a four-year period, and it caused an undermining of public confidence in the
an important government function. The government asserts that Wolfe’s conduct in this regard
November 1, 2018, but submits to the Court that the reasoning underlying this amendment actually
undercuts its application in this case. As a preliminary matter, the amendment was adopted to
recognize that that recidivist rates for individuals with no prior contact with the criminal justice
system are very low. This rationale does not apply here, where the government is seeking an
above-guideline sentence for reasons that are wholly independent of specific deterrence of the
defendant.
2
The government has reviewed the letters of support written for the defendant, including
those written by the SSCI and former members of the USIC. The letters share a certain common
theme, which is perhaps best summarized as follows: the defendant appeared steadfast and honest
in my multiple dealings, and I believe he kept secrets to which I was privy. What is missing from
any of these letters, however, is a person who says they knew the double life that Wolfe was
leading, and that they were aware he was sharing information from the SSCI with multiple national
security reporters over multiple years.
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Further, the amendment plainly does not address application to cases involving departures
based on national security risks or interference with core governmental functions. Where, as here,
the government seeks a departure which places the defendant in Zone D, the amendment is further
inapplicable on its face. Id. at 73 (limiting amendment to cases where the “applicable guideline
ranges are in Zones A or B of the Sentencing Table”). To the extent that the Court is considering
alternative punishment, the government believes its requested sentence of 24 months incarceration
§5F1.1, Application Note 2 (“Community confinement generally should not be imposed for a
period in excess of six months”). The government does, however, seek special conditions of
supervised release as part of any sentence fashioned by the Court, which should include the
existing conditions of release that relate to his access to, and application for positions involving,
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the government respectfully submits that a custodial term
Respectfully submitted,
JESSIE K. LIU
United States Attorney
D.C. Bar No. 472845
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Government’s Reply to the Defendant’s
Sentencing Memorandum was served on the following counsel by electronic mail on December
14, 2018:
_________/s/__________________
Jocelyn Ballantine
Assistant U.S. Attorney
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REPLY ADDENDUM
Government Exhibit 14
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Government Exhibit 15
Reporter #5 Reporter #5
Government Exhibit 16
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