What went wrong with ED 202? – I


Captain Fahd Hassan August 02, 2010

Airblue Flight ED202 from Karachi to Islamabad on July 28 was the last leg of an otherwise perfect flight that shouldn’t have ended the way it did. Seemingly, a perfectly functioning aircraft, computerised to the heart, being flown by two of the finest men in the business found a fatal mark in the middle of an easily recognisable mountain and went straight for it. Of course, moments later the plane and its occupants were only a smouldering wreck. Almost immediately, aviation ‘experts’ from around Pakistan gave tons of ‘skilful opinion’ as to what might have happened, most of it really absurd. The pilots and the Civil Aviation Authority immediately received flak. Some even thought of suing the airline. There were others however, that cut down trees and paved way for the rescue teams to reach the site immediately upon impact.

So what happened? Apparently bad weather, but not severe enough to bring down an airliner. These pilots were only trying to land through a weather system that was perhaps, at worst, only asking them to go elsewhere. Given the aircraft’s capability and experience of its pilot, it was safe enough to give it a try, remaining well within safety parameters and procedures and if that didn’t work, the plane could have been flown to another airport and return when the weather got better.

To start with, the aircraft was flying in a condition where there was precipitation-induced poor visibility and very low clouds.  It had the only option, like all other approaching aircraft, to land at Runway 12 (which runs in a southeasterly direction). Ordinarily at Islamabad airport, an aircraft would approach normally – which would be to use Runway 30 (which runs in a northwesterly direction). For some days prior to the crash, unfavourable weather (high winds/poor visibility) meant that pilots were being asked to use Runway 12. Normally what is done is to use the weather-favourable runway or if that is not possible then to use Runway 30 because it has an instrument landing system (ILS). As he does this, the pilot can execute a missed approach at a height higher than that for one in the normal approach (for Runway 30). After that he begins a mix of ‘contact’ and ‘circle to land’ procedure. This would mean that after going past Runway 30, the pilot comes around and tries to land at Runway 12, all the time remaining in visual contact with the airport. If visual contact can’t be made at any point, then the aircraft is advised to fly to another airport, in this case, Peshawar, Lahore, or even Multan.

This circle-to-land procedure is safe; the flight pattern is engineered to perfection, well within five miles of the destination airport, mostly flown parallel to the runway. Yet this aircraft was not flying parallel to the runway but in an angle roughly 45 degrees from it, and not only that, it had taken a path more than seven miles in that direction. That is why it flew over I-8/3 and Blue Area towards Saidpur Village and from there, for reasons that await investigation, the pilots turned left into their destiny along with the other 150 mortals on board. Perhaps he had lost visual contact with the runway and while executing circling approach was forced into a detour, thinking he’d get the primary ILS if he turned left turn – with his reverse sensing equipment.

If the report that air traffic control warned him of the terrain close to the plane and that he acknowledged it is correct, then the only things that come to mind are either that his path was intercepted by a low cloud, or that he was too complacent in his judgment of the point at which he had to start turning the plane. Perhaps the pilot got an incorrect reading from the GPS terrain or maybe it was massive wind shear that got the better of the jet. The point is that there are so many factors and it is difficult to say anything in hindsight. But there’s no doubt that the two pilots, one an experienced airliner and the other a PAF officer, did all they could to prevent the plane from crashing.

Published in The Express Tribune, August 3rd, 2010.

COMMENTS (25)

shakir | 13 years ago | Reply Meekal. I dont quite underestand your point either. the information in fahd's article was clear that he wouldnt comment on what happened from comfort of an arm chair or what is said to be a comment made in hindsight. he said investigation must be awaited. secondly, your assertion that investigation team was made up of inexperienced desk job flunks is not quite right. one of the members on that team, Mujahid Islam (PAF Group Captain)is one of most leading aircraft accident investigators. he was invited over at crashes like the lockeree and the TWA crash and also successfully investigated the multan crash. it was up to the government that withheld information from multan crash otherwise investigated well. in case of this crash ed 202 few things r known that the pilot perhaps wanted to try approaching 12 using the FMS and tried created room for himself by extening into the approach and somehow found himself in fatal error. again this information came to me out of the writer who has his opinion and wouldnt say anything till investigation is done, 'i cant comment till those entrusted with job publish their finds' he says. the only one thing we discussed was that something distracted both pilots into a fatal error. may be the captain was busy explaining the FMS to the first officer or whatever, with this experience such error cant be explained. second, whether or not not there was VOR/DME for 12 and there are quite a few proce3dures there, why were the pilots led away. situational disorientation or something else, fahd would have a book on the subject a lot of science express tribune wouldnt have been able to publish given space limitations. fahd may not be all the perfect but what i could gather he discussed almost 12 possibilities to the fatal crash and had left it to investigators before saying anything about it. fahd is a pilot and understands the cockpit and human factors well and was very mature enough not to point fingers at this point even though many 'experts' have talked about the easy 'Pilot Error' thing, not knowing it is the pilots that conduct millions of flight ops a year and on rare occasions err and try making amends by adaptation of investigative results. please wait for investigations the men at work there are good men, one the best in the world.
Meekal Ahmed | 13 years ago | Reply Gentlemen, The only point I made above is that the Capt. Hassan did not ADD anything that was not already known. There is no NEW information. We still don't know why he was where he was when he is supposed to keep it close and tight and be VISUAL at all times. If he loses visual contact he is supposed to immediately execute a go-around -- which he may have been doing but it was too late. If the A321 was equipped with EGPWS (since it was a new plane it should have been) which has a terrain map, he should have got plenty of warning about rising terrain ahead of him. So what happened? On another newspaper this morning I see that we have appointed a bunch of bureaucrats in the CAA as the investigation team. There are no outside parties or air accident experts. A pilot from Airblue on the team does not mean he knows anything about investigating an air accident. Is this going to be another cover-up and farce like all the previous accidents with no report at the end? We need to have people from Airbus, the US NTSB and/or the UK Air Accidents Branch. Having outside experts will also ensure there is no tampering with the DFDR, the CVR or the ATC tapes. On an aviation forum I am a member of (almost exclusively made up of very experienced pilots) one person drew a VOR/DME approach for 12. Capt. Hassan knows what I am talking about. So rather than this circle-to-land, why isn't there a VOR/DME procedure for 12 which goes nowhere near the Margalla hills?
VIEW MORE COMMENTS
Replying to X

Comments are moderated and generally will be posted if they are on-topic and not abusive.

For more information, please see our Comments FAQ